Detail
The mechanism
You enroll a device (phone, laptop) with a biometric — face, fingerprint, or a hardware key. The device generates a public/private keypair per site. The public key registers at the site; the private key never leaves your device. On login, the site sends a challenge; your device signs it with the private key; the site verifies the signature.
Why it's not just 'better MFA'
A password + MFA still stores a password at the site. Every breach still leaks credentials. Passwordless removes the password entirely — the credential the site stores is a public key, which is useless to a thief because it can only verify, not produce, signatures.
What breaks in a breach
A traditional password DB breach leaks hashes that can be brute-forced offline. A passwordless site breach leaks public keys, which are meaningless in isolation. That is the incident class removal — not incident probability reduction.
What H33 adds on top of WebAuthn
WebAuthn is a standard; H33 is the identity that owns the WebAuthn credentials. It manages enrollment across devices, adds guardian recovery so the biometric is not a single point of failure, and signs every action (not just the initial login) so the whole session is cryptographically bound.