Use case · Identity
Protect home WiFi.
House Wi-Fi passwords get screenshotted to guests and never rotate. Kids' devices leak the credential to their friends' phones. Contractors keep access after the job. There is no per-person access control.
The change: Identity-attested Wi-Fi credentials · shared with authority, not with text.
How it works
Four steps · every step signs a receipt.
House Wi-Fi credentials live in the credential vault (H33-Key) · never shared as plaintext
Guest access is issued per-person · scoped to time window · revocable instantly
Kids' devices trust the network via their own identity · not by knowing a shared password
Contractor access expires automatically at the end of the scheduled job
Evidence
The proof this actually works.
- Every access grant is a signed receipt · you know when the babysitter connected the tablet
- Revocation is cryptographic · a departing guest's device stops trusting the network the moment you revoke
- Post-quantum from day one · the identity that trusts the network is the same one that signs everything else
- Edge case: Guest with no smartphone: fall back to a time-scoped PSK that expires at end of visit
- Edge case: IoT devices that can't do WebAuthn: H33-Key issues per-device credentials with the same audit and revocation model
Related capabilities
If you're comparing alternatives
Trust status
Runs today. Honest about what's next.
We publish what's shipped and what's coming — the same list on every page.
Runs today
- Vault workflows running in production
- Cryptographic receipts emitted per action
- Immutable audit trail · Object-Locked
- Auth1 · Wallet · Document · Audit APIs
- Post-quantum primitives (Dilithium + Kyber)
- Benchmark v12 · 2,293,766 auth/sec
Coming next
- Public /verify/
/ receipt viewer - Public /replay/
/ decision viewer - docs.h33.you developer documentation
- SOC 2 Type II Certified
- Payment Requests + Rewards adapters